Sažetak
Cilj rada je analizirati pravnu prirodu i konceptualne granice termina “etničko čišćenje” u međunarodnom pravu, posebno kroz njegovu primjenu u dokumentima Ujedinjenih nacija tokom oružanog sukoba u Bosni i Hercegovini. Rad nastoji utvrditi da li “etničko čišćenje” predstavlja samostalan međunarodni zločin, formu genocida, eufemizam za genocid, ili oblik progona kao zločina protiv čovječnosti. Istraživanje se zasniva na analizi primarnih međunarodnopravnih izvora, rezolucija Vijeća sigurnosti i Generalne skupštine UN, izvještaja Komisije eksperata UN, Konvencije o sprečavanju i kažnjavanju zločina genocida, te presuda i nalaza Međunarodnog krivičnog tribunala za bivšu Jugoslaviju (ICTY) i Međunarodnog suda u Hagu (ICJ). Metodološki okvir uključuje normativnu analizu, komparativnu analizu sudske prakse i kritičku interpretaciju pojmova actus reus i mens rea relevantnih međunarodnih zločina. Analiza pokazuje da je termin “etničko čišćenje” historijski korišten kao politički i deskriptivni izraz, naročito u prvim reakcijama UN na teška kršenja međunarodnog humanitarnog prava u Bosni i Hercegovini. Komisija eksperata UN i ICTY prepoznala je da prakse koje se označavaju kao “etničko čišćenje” obuhvataju širok spektar djela: ubistva, mučenja, seksualno nasilje, prisilna premještanja i deportacije, što korespondira sa zločinima protiv čovječnosti, a u određenim okolnostima može doseći nivo genocida. Međunarodni sud u Hagu utvrdio je da izraz nema zasebno i samostalno pravno značenje u okviru Konvencije o genocidu, te da kvalifikacija “etničkog čišćenja” kao genocida ovisi o postojanju posebne namjere uništenja grupe kao takve. Praksa Tribunala, posebno u predmetima Nikolić, Mladić, Karadžić i Krstić, pokazuje da “etničko čišćenje” može biti dokaz genocidne namjere, ali i da u brojnim slučajevima predstavlja progon kao zločin protiv čovječnosti, a ne genocid. “Etničko čišćenje” ne Prof. dr. Enis Omerović predstavlja samostalan međunarodni zločin prema važećem međunarodnom pravu. Njegova kvalifikacija isključivo zavisi od sadržaja konkretnih radnji i posebne namjere počinitelja. U nekim slučajevima ono može biti oblik ili dokaz genocida, dok u drugima predstavlja progon ili druge zločine protiv čovječnosti. Odnosni izraz ostaje “pokretan” i konceptualno nestabilan, što stvara izazove za jasno pravno razgraničenje i buduće normativno uobličavanje.
Abstract
The aim of this paper is to analyse the legal nature and conceptual boundaries of the term “ethnic cleansing” in international law, with particular attention to its application in the United Nations documents during the armed conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The paper seeks to determine whether “ethnic cleansing” constitutes an autonomous international crime, a form of genocide, an euphemism for genocide, or a form of persecution as a crime against humanity. The research is based on an analysis of primary international legal sources, including the UN Security Council and the General Assembly resolutions, reports of the UN Commission of Experts, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, and the judgments and findings of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The methodological framework includes normative analysis, comparative analysis of judicial practice, and critical interpretation of the concepts of actus reus and mens rea of the relevant international crimes. The analysis demonstrates that the term “ethnic cleansing” has historically been used as a political and descriptive expression, particularly in the initial UN responses to gross violations of international humanitarian law in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The UN Commission of Experts and the ICTY recognised that practices labelled as “ethnic cleansing” encompassed a broad range of acts—killings, torture, sexual violence, forced displacement and deportation—which correspond to crimes against humanity and, in certain circumstances, may reach the threshold of genocide. The International Court of Justice determined that the term has no independent legal meaning “ETNIČKO ČIŠĆENJE” – NAJA V A GENOCIDA, NJEGOVO SREDSTVO I CILJ? within the framework of the Genocide Convention and that the qualification of “ethnic cleansing” as genocide depends on the existence of a specific intent to destroy a protected group as such. The Tribunal’s jurisprudence, particularly in the cases of Nikolić, Mladić, Karadžić, and Krstić, illustrates that “ethnic cleansing” may serve as evidence of genocidal intent, but also that in numerous cases it constitutes persecution as a crime against humanity rather than genocide. “Ethnic cleansing” does not constitute an autonomous international crime under contemporary international law. Its legal qualification depends entirely on the nature of the acts carried out and the specific intent of the perpetrators. In some instances, it may amount to a form or evidentiary indicator of genocide, whereas in others it constitutes persecution or other crimes against humanity. The term remains fluid and conceptually unstable, creating significant challenges for precise legal categorisation and future normative development.